The Middle East Conflict: The Great Power Games And Their Unintended Consequences

Actions of great powers have profound, often unintended, consequences. The United States, as the preeminent global power after the Second World War, intervened in global affairs several times in the past eight decades. Sometimes, the US actions had a benign and positive impact. For instance, the Marshall Plan, through which the US provided massive financial assistance (about $150-180 billion at current prices) to rebuild Western Europe after the devastation of the war, stimulated economies, strengthened alliances, and promoted trade. In many ways, the resultant European Recovery Programme was the bulwark of the NATO alliance.

Similarly, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were the beneficiaries of the US’s benevolence.

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But the Indo-China region of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos suffered grievously because of the US misadventures in its quest to combat communism. The devastating consequences of the intervention in Afghanistan (1980-88), the invasion of Afghanistan (2001), and the invasion of Iraq (2003) are still being felt by the people of those countries, as well as the rest of the world. The rise of the Taliban and the emergence of Al Qaeda and ISIS can be directly traced to the US policies and interventions.

What will be the verdict of future historians about the current joint war of the US and Israel against Iran launched on Feb 28? From the perspective of the United Nations Charter and international law, Amir-Saeid Iravani, the permanent representative of Iran to the UN, succinctly summed up the arguments of opponents of the attack on Iran. But then it is an ambassador’s job to argue his country’s case, sidestepping the follies and provocations of the theocratic regime in Iran.

According to the United Nations Charter, a nation is justified in waging war or using military force only in self-defence against an armed attack or invasion, or if use of force is authorised by the UN Security Council (with no permanent member opposing it). Neither of these conditions is fulfilled in the current case.

But deeper examination reveals the complexities of the situation. The theocratic regime in Iran that acquired power with the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 has repeatedly and officially threatened to erase Israel out of existence. ‘Death to Israel’ and ‘Death to America’ have been the mantras adopted by the regime for decades. Active efforts to acquire nuclear weapons (the level of enrichment of uranium resorted to by Iran is only suitable for nuclear weapons and not for civil nuclear energy) accompanying the constant threats and creation and arming of four militant and terrorist non-state groups—Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas (Gaza), Houthis (Yemen), and the Muslim Brotherhood (Iraq and Syria)—can be categorised as continuous and serious threats to the security of other nations. And the ruthless violence and executions of its own citizens demonstrating peacefully come under the category of serious violations of human rights. Clearly, the case is much more complicated than it appears at first sight.

If we leave legalities aside, the real practical question is whether this war will solve any problems or will it complicate the situation further. The answer will probably be in two parts. As far as Iran's threat to Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries is concerned, this US-Israeli attack degrading the missile infrastructure and destroying the uranium-enrichment facilities will probably make them safer for some years. But the 12-day war of June 2025 already destroyed the nuclear facilities. Now probably the missile capability will be severely weakened. The proxy terrorist outfits will probably be weakened considerably, and Iranian state support to them may end for all practical purposes. But again, Israel already substantially neutralised the two most entrenched groups—Hamas and Hezbollah—even before the current war. Therefore, this war could have been avoided through diplomacy.

Perhaps the most important question is: will the long-suffering people of Iran taste liberty and prosperity as a result of this war? Sadly, at this point in time the chances are slim. The regime in Iran is firmly and deeply entrenched. While probably a majority of the people want to see the theocratic regime collapse, there is neither the organisation nor logistical support available for the people to overthrow the entrenched, ruthless regime. Iran is a vast country—about half India's size. The US and Israel have ruled out boots on the ground. Invasions of proud nations normally end in disaster. The chances are that the regime will be weakened in relation to the neighbouring countries, but it will be in control domestically. Or there may be civil war, anarchy, and mass migration. That is a terrible outcome for the people of Iran, who inherit a great civilisation. So, what does this war achieve except tremendous destruction, uncertainty in West Asia, and a potential setback to the modernisation and secularisation that the Gulf countries have embarked upon? The threat to global energy security and the travails of millions of citizens and expatriates in the region are real and pronounced. If the war is prolonged, it will take a heavy toll on the global economy. For that reason, the war may not last more than four or five weeks. But the damage even in a limited war will be considerable, and its negative impact far-reaching.

Arab League Warns Iranian Escalation Puts Region On ‘Dangerous Trajectory’

Again, the story of the UK-US conspiracy to oust the popular, nationalist prime minister Mossadegh in 1953 in the misadventure of Operation Ajax should be a cautionary tale. Britain was outraged that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was nationalised by Mossadegh. The UK government headed by Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden persuaded a reluctant US to hatch a conspiracy and organise a coup. President Truman rejected the plan, but Eisenhower was pressurised to give the green signal to the coup. The Iranian clergy, with an eye on strengthening their hold, actively supported the removal of the nationalist, secular Mossadegh. A reluctant Shah was enticed with the possibility of real power. Mossadegh was removed and jailed, and the Shah concentrated power in his hands. There was a political vacuum in the country, and when the Shah faced popular unrest, the only force to replace the monarchy was the clergy. Britain and the US thought they succeeded brilliantly in 1953. But history proved otherwise. What will history’s verdict be two decades from now?

The author is the founder of Lok Satta movement and Foundation for Democratic Reforms. Email: [email protected] / Twitter@jp_loksatta

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