"Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press": "Broad Evidence, and Silently Consistent Precedents"

· Reason

I thought I'd serialize my new Notre Dame Law Review article, "Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"; here's the first Part:

* * *

Visit somethingsdifferent.biz for more information.

In certain areas, First Amendment precedent turns out to be quite consistent with original meaning—even though the Court hasn't squarely discussed historical evidence in any detail. This might be a fortunate accident, or perhaps a random coincidence in the policy judgments of the modern Court and the Framing generation. But I expect that some at least stems from a phenomenon that Justice Scalia discussed in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995): "Principles of liberty fundamental enough to have been embodied within constitutional guarantees are not readily erased from the Nation's consciousness. A governmental practice that has become general throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of constitutionality."

In some situations, this observation may not be accurate. But in others, there really does appear to be a longstanding constitutional understanding that has become so much part of the law that a court that simply follows doctrine will incorporate original meaning. Let me offer three examples.

A. "The Liberty of the Press Is Not Confined to Newspapers and Periodicals"

The Supreme Court has generally held that the First Amendment equally protects all who speak to the public, whether they are professional media (e.g., newspaper publishers or reporters) or nonprofessionals (e.g., leafletters). In this respect, it has treated "the freedom … of the press" as protecting the press as technology—the use of the printing press and its technological heirs—rather than the press as industry, in the sense of people whose daily job is writing for the public.

Now the original articulation of this position in the Supreme Court came in Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), with little historical analysis:

The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.

And this is so even though the Court had shown an interest in Framing-era history. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson (1931) discussed that history in striking down an injunction against the operation of a "scandalous" newspaper. Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) discussed history in considerably more detail in holding unconstitutional a selective tax on certain newspapers.

More recently, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) offered a bit more historical analysis:

The dissent … interpret[s] the Freedom of the Press Clause to refer to the institutional press (thus demonstrating, according to the dissent, that the Founders "did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of 'speakers,' or speech outlets or forms"). It is passing strange to interpret the phrase "the freedom of speech, or of the press" to mean, not everyone's right to speak or publish, but rather everyone's right to speak or the institutional press's right to publish. No one thought that is what it meant. Patriot Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary contains, under the word "press," the following entry:

"Liberty of the press, in civil policy, is the free right of publishing books, pamphlets or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject only to punishment for publishing what is pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state."

As the Court's opinion describes, our jurisprudence agrees with Noah Webster and contradicts the dissent.

"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets…. The press in its historical connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."

But this is still predominantly a precedential analysis, with one textual argument and one early republican source.

At the same time, the foundational case in the Court—Lovell—followed 150 years of established practice, to the point that the Court might not have seen the need to do more than just nod to "[t]he press in its historic connotation."

As I've laid out elsewhere, Framing-era legal sources, such as cases, treatises, and constitutional provisions, articulated the freedom of the press as extending to everyone, not just to professional newspaper publishers. {See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 (2012) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom for the Press]; Eugene Volokh, The Press Clause: Important, Remembered, and Equally Shared, 5 J. Free Speech L. 659 (2025).} Then, starting in the 1820s, courts began to expressly hold that newspaper printers' and editors' rights were equal to everyone else's. In the following decades, that was repeated in case after case throughout the country. By the time Lovell was decided, the principle was well-established in the precedents, and, to my knowledge, unanimously so. The original meaning had made its way into well-settled doctrine and was then ratified by the Court in Lovell.

The original meaning also fit with practice, which took place in the shadow of the law but which likely also affected the law. In the Framing era, many influential Americans published their views using the printing press, whether in pamphlets or as submissions to newspapers. It would be odd to think that they would have secured special constitutional rights to the just-emerging category of newspapermen, who were in some measure lower status than they were, while denying the same rights to themselves.

And though those newspapers became relatively more influential in the following centuries, a tradition of leafletting and pamphleteering continued. The Court in 1938 could see the media reality as well as media law and naturally view the nonprofessional leafletter as having the same free press rights as a professional newspaper editor.

B. Symbolic Expression

The very first case in which the Supreme Court struck down government action as violating constitutional rights of freedom of expression, Stromberg v. California (1931), involved neither the press nor speech in the literal sense. Rather, it involved what one might today call symbolic expression (or expressive conduct)—the display of a red flag as a revolutionary symbol.

But the opinion never discussed why displaying a flag counted as "speech" or "press." The opinion below similarly assumed that symbolic expression was as protected as verbal expression, and so did the parties' briefs in the Supreme Court. The Court had neither before nor since analyzed whether this result is consistent with the original meaning of the free expression guarantees. {See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 Geo. L.J. 1057 (2009).}

Likewise, the 1920 California Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Hartman (1920) struck down an earlier law banning the possession or display of flags that represented efforts "espous[ing] for the government of … the United States of America … principles or theories of government antagonistic … to the form of the government thereof as now constituted." The court concluded that Americans have "the right to advocate peaceable changes in our Constitution, laws or form of government," and that therefore "an organization peaceably advocating such changes may adopt a flag … signifying its purpose, and that the display or possession of such flag … cannot be made an unlawful act." The court simply assumed that symbolic expression was constitutionally equivalent to verbal expression, without discussing the matter further.

But while these assumptions weren't backed by any originalist analysis, they appear to have been fully consistent with the Framing-era understanding that symbolic expression, pictorial expression, and verbal expression were generally treated as functionally equivalent. This equivalence was most often drawn with regard to restrictions on expression, such as defamation law. But it was also the view taken in the early republic with regard to constitutional protections for expression.

Thus, for instance, pre-Revolutionary libel law recognized the category of libel by "pictures, signs, and the like"—meaning through symbols, whether printed or physically displayed—as tantamount to libel by writing. Early American law did the same, extending the same principle to incitement to riot as well. Early treatises drew this equivalence. Early court decisions suggested that pictorial and symbolic expression was potentially protected by free expression guarantees (though subject to the same constitutionally permissible restrictions, such as libel law, as verbal expression).

To offer a particularly vivid illustration, consider the report of Mezzara's Case (1817), apparently the earliest American case involving nonverbal libel—there, a painting of the plaintiff with donkey's ears. The reporter, a New York lawyer, followed the case with a note hypothesizing what would happen if the painting were an apt commentary on the subject's folly and lack of patriotism. In such a situation, the reporter wrote, "[I]f the painter could show the truth of the matter in evidence, as before described, and that he published and exhibited the picture, 'with good motives and for justifiable ends,' … would he not be justifiable under our statute?"

The statute the reporter cites—which did allow truth as a defense in libel actions, if the defendant acted with good motives and for justifiable ends—was passed in the wake of the New York court's evenly dividing in People v. Croswell (1804) on whether the freedom of the press mandated that the defense of truth be allowed in libel prosecutions. The statute implemented Chancellor James Kent's view of the constitutional rule, which was also the view championed by Alexander Hamilton (as Croswell's lawyer) in one of the last public acts of his life, and was seen as an important protection for the liberty of the press. And just four years after Mezzara's Case, at the next New York constitutional convention, the statute's provisions were adopted as part of the New York Constitution.

The reporter thus saw nothing odd in treating a painting as protected by free expression principles, just as the court saw nothing odd in treating a painting as punishable under libel law principles. Likewise, three-dimensional symbolic expression, such as the raising of a liberty pole, was similarly treated as being potentially constitutionally protected just as pictorial and verbal expression were (though again subject to the possible constitutional limitations imposed on verbal expression).

This equivalence of symbolic, pictorial, and verbal expression unsurprisingly endured as part of the law—most often discussed as to libel law—throughout the 1800s and early 1900s. The Supreme Court, for instance, mentioned in 1845 that libel was a "species of defamation which is effected by writing or printing, or by pictures and signs," and in 1904 quoted a law enacted by the Philippine Commission that offered the same definition. There had been hundreds of similar holdings from state courts, whether explicating the common law or state statutes (and often including "effigies" alongside pictures and signs). Legal treatises had set forth the same principle.

Thus, again, when the cases came before the California Supreme Court in 1920 and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1931, it was natural for the courts and the litigants to casually assume that symbolic expression (there using flags) was likewise treated equivalently to verbal expression for purposes of freedom of expression law. What was accepted in the Framing era continued to be accepted, without any felt need for discussion, in the early 1900s. And here too this conclusion was supported by a long tradition of practice as well as doctrine: Symbolic expression (whether through effigies, processions, visual puns, and the like) was commonplace in the Framing era, and flags and other forms of symbols continued to be used the same way into the 1900s.

C. Civil Liability

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan's "actual malice" requirement has of course been criticized as contrary to the original meaning of the First Amendment. But some have also criticized the case on the grounds that it improperly imports freedom of expression principles into civil tort liability. Here too the Court has never tried to explain this particular conclusion on originalist grounds. Likewise, none of the briefs in Sullivan made an originalist argument in favor of applying constitutional limitations to common law civil lawsuits.

Nonetheless, here too this may have stemmed from the longstanding understanding, dating back to the Framing era, that freedom of expression guarantees did indeed potentially apply to civil liability. We see that starting with 1802 and 1806 decisions from the Vermont and South Carolina high courts, rejecting liability in part by citing the state equivalents of the Petition Clause. {See generally Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 249 (2010) (discussing this).}  And we see that in other cases from 1799 onwards that reasoned that constitutional protections may apply to civil lawsuits as well as to criminal prosecutions, but that libelous speech was constitutionally unprotected against civil liability as well as against criminal punishment. Early commentators took the same view.

And here too the early original meaning turned into well-established constitutional tradition. Throughout the 1800s and 1900s, court decisions routinely assumed that constitutional protections could limit civil liability, though subject to the recognition that there was essentially a First Amendment libel exception for civil as well as criminal liability. By the time of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), this position just wasn't particularly controversial, even if the other features of that decision were.

The post "Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press": "Broad Evidence, and Silently Consistent Precedents" appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Read full story at source